We propose a multi-agent approach to compare the eectiveness of macroprudential capital requirements, where banks are embedded in an articial macroeconomy. Capital requirements are derived from alternative systemic-risk metrics that reect both the vulnerability or impact of nancial institutions. Our objective is to explore how systemic-risk measures could be translated in capital requirements and test them in a comprehensive framework. Based on our counterfactual scenarios, we nd that macro-prudential capital requirements derived from vulnerability measures of systemic-risk can improve nancial stability without jeopardizing output and credit supply. Moreover, macroprudential regulation applied to systemic important banks might be counterproductive for systemic groups of banks.
1.

Introduction
The concept of systemic risk (SR) is relatively recent in economic and nancial literature. The rst appearance in scientic articles dates back to the early '90s, even if citations reveal that most of these contributions have been revived after 2008, when the term regained strength with the crisis. ECB (2009, p. 134) provide a general denition: it refers to the risk that nancial instability becomes so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a nancial system to the point where economic growth and welfare suer materially." The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was established by the EU on 16 December 2009, based on the recommendation of the de Larosière report" of bringing the European Union forward. The ESRB has a macroprudential mandate whose objective is to prevent and mitigate systemic risk in the EU. The recommendation of ESRB have shaped the conduct of macroprudential policies in EU countries and provided guidance for its implementation through a set of macroprudential policy tools (ESRB, 2014a,b) . Within this framework, the systemic risk buer (SRB) is designed to prevent and mitigate structural systemic risks of a long-term, non-cyclical nature that are not covered by the Capital Requirements, including excessive leverage. The SRB is an additional capital requirement imposed on credit institutions, proportional to their total risk exposure, to cover unexpected losses and keep themselves solvent in a crisis. The introduction of a capital buer applies to all systemically important institutions, both at the global (G-SIIs) and national (O-SIIs) levels. While for some instruments authorities have recommended to use prescriptive measures (such as the credit-to-gdp gap for the countercyclical capital buer), considerable dierences across countries exist regarding the level, range and calculation basis of the SRB. There is no maximum limit for the SRB, but authorisation from the European Commission is required for buer rates higher than 3%. Caps on the SRB have been under the spotlight as often perceived as being too low to mitigate the risk some institutions pose to the nancial system. Furthermore, SRB are hard to implement, inter alia because they need to be computed from a reliable measure of systemic risk: it is however unclear which metric performs better and under what circumstances. The task is more intricate given that systemic events are observed infrequently, as a banking crisis is observed on average every 35 years for OECD countries (Danielsson et al., 2018) .
In this article we propose a methodology to explore the eectiveness of capital surcharges implemented in the form of a systemic-risk buer derived from dierent systemic risk measures. Banks are required to maintain a level of common equity tier 1 adequate to meet a systemic-risk weighted share of their assets. By assuming that banks adopt dierent capital rules within a multi-agent macro-economic model, we quantify the impact of such policies in a stress-test scenario-based analysis. Many techniques have been proposed so far to measure systemic risk, but there is no consensus among scholars on which is most appropriate. We consider two alternative classes, namely market-based and network approaches. Each one can measure systemic-risk in terms of both vulnerability or impact. Vulnerability focuses on the eect of a systemic event on the capital of a given bank, while impact captures the losses to produced by the distress of one, or few, institutions on the rest of the nancial system.
We conduct counterfactual policy experiments in an agent-based model (ABM) of the economy based on Gurgone et al. (2018) . The original model is expanded to allow banks to employ systemic-risk measures to determine their capital requirements. 1 In the rst set of experiments we assume that capital requirements are set on the basis of vulnerability metrics, so that fragile banks are required to hold more equity capital than sound banks. However, this might not be satisfactory, as it does not operate on systemic impact of banks. Hence in the second set of experiments capital requirements depend on the impact of banks on the system, or the extent of externalities they produce in case of default.
We nd that systemic-capital requirements based on vulnerability are able to stabilize the economy. Having them in place is preferable to a standard rule that determines regulatory equity as a xed fraction of assets. On the other hand, systemic-capital requirements based on impact may lead to suboptimal outcomes and produce detrimental eects on nancial stability. This is relevant when systemic-risk is not concentrated in few superspreaders, but is diluted in groups of banks with similar behavior and exposures to risk. Moreover, both market and network policies turn out to be procyclical. They also dier in some aspects: the former exhibit a regime switch during the rst period of a crisis, while the latter can better capture the evolution of systemic risk but are highly correlated with the exposures to equity ratio prevailing in the nancial system. This paper is the rst attempt to: (i) compare systemic risk measures recently proposed in the literature from both the perspectives of vulnerability of single institutions to system wide shocks and the individual impacts of institution distress on the nancial system overall; (i) suggest how to incorporate heterogeneous systemic-risk metrics into banks' capital requirements; (iii) analyse the impact of the SRB macroprudential tool by means of simulated data generated by a multi-agents model, rather than empirically observed data that, given the rare occurrence of systemic crisis, are scant. Our simulated economy produces data on returns on equities of banks and at the same time includes a network structure of interlocked balance sheets, thus it allows for a double comparison.
The usage of an ABM allows to apply both network and market-based techniques to measure systemic risk. Financial networks between banks and rms and within the interbank sector arise endogenously as a consequence of interaction in ABMs. This feature can be employed to run network-based algorithms as DebtRank. This would not be feasible in an aggregate macroeconomic model.
Moreover, working with a model rather than a dataset permits to design how to 1 Note that we do not consider in our model the full range of capital buers typically used by macroprudential authorities e.g. countercyclical capital buers, liquidity buer ratio, etc make comparisons, and explore counterfactual scenarios that generate articial data.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the related literature. Nucera et al. (2016) and Giglio et al. (2016) both apply principal component analysis to a range of systemic risk measures in the attempt to capture the multiple aspects of systemic risk. A useful discussion on the diculty in nding a measure that can capture all aspects of systemic risk can be found in Hansen (2013) .
Other studies assume that the regulator is disposed to tolerate a systemicwide risk level and aims to reach the most parsimonious feasible capitalization at the aggregate level. Such objective is formally translated into a constrained optimization problem, whose solution includes both the unique level of capital in the banking system and its distribution across banks. Tarashev et al. (2010) nd that if capital surcharges are set in order to equalize individual contributions to systemic risk, then a lower level of aggregate capital is needed to reach the system-wide risk objective. Webber and Willison (2011) nd that optimal systemic capital requirements increase in balance sheet size and in the value of interbank obligations. However, they are also found to be strongly pro-cyclical.
Another set of contributions presents network approaches to quantify systemic risk. Battiston et al. (2016) and sell their output on the goods market. The banking sector provides credit to rms, subject to regulatory constraints. In each period every bank tries to anticipate its liquidity needs and accesses the interbank market as a lender or a borrower. If a bank is short of liquidity, it seeks an advance from the CB.
The special agency was not present in Gurgone et al. (2018) . It has been introduced as a convenient way to model the secondary market for loans. It acts as a liquidator when banks default or when banks exceed the regulatory constraint and thus must de-leverage. The assets in its portfolio are then put on the market and can be purchased by those banks that have a positive credit supply. Further details about the working of the special agency are described in the section below.
Banks
Assets Liabilities
Firms Assets Liabilities
Dep L nw F (Gurgone et al., 2018) does not include households' borrowing since it is mainly focused on credit to rms and on the interbank market.
market and from banks to rms. 3 The process is illustrated in Fig. 1 and terminates only when there are no new losses. The balance sheets of rms and banks are illustrated in Table 1. rm-bank bank-bank bank-rm Figure 1 : Diagram of the distress transmission. The distress is transmitted through the credit market (rm-bank), the interbank market (bank-bank) and banks' deposits (bank-rms).
Liquidation of assets The contagion dynamic is enhanced by the forced liquidation of assets sold by defaulted banks in order to repay creditors. The role of liquidator is operated by a special agency that buys the assets of bank i at price p:
where ∆q i,τ is the quantity of loans that bank i needs to liquidate, 4 is the asset price elasticity, q t is the total quantity of loans in period t. Banks that need liquidity enter the market in a random order represented by the subscript τ ; we assume that at the end of each period of the simulation, the initial asset price is set again at p 0 = 1. The assets purchased by the agency are then put on sale before the credit market opens (lending to rms). Banks with positive net worth and complying with regulatory leverage rate can buy them at their net present value.
Recovery rates The eective loss on a generic asset
, where ϕ is the recovery rate. Each of j's creditors can recover 3 If the net worth of a bank is negative, it defaults on its liabilities including the deposits of rms and households. A deposit guarantee scheme is not implemented. 4 Banks rst determine their liquidity need, then compute the fair value of their portfolio loan by loan. Next they determine ∆q taking into account eq. (1). Lastly, they choose which loans should be liquidated to reach their objective.
The loans for sale are evaluated at their fair market value by discounting cash ows:
where L i,j is the book value of the loan of bank i to rm j, S is the residual maturity, r f is the interest rate on the loan, ρ f is the default probability of rm j, and r is the risk-free rate. ϕ ij = Aj Lj , i.e. the ratio of borrower's assets (A) to liabilities (L). However, the nominal value of illiquid assets is not immediately convertible in cash and must be rst liquidated to compensate creditors. We denote the liquidation value of the assets of bank j with A liq j,t , with A liq j,t ≤ A j,t . The actual recovery rate can be written as:
Furthermore, we assume that there is a pecking order of creditors, so that they are not equal from the viewpoint of bankruptcy law: the most guaranteed is the central bank, then depositors and nally banks with interbank loans.
For instance, those creditors who claim interbank loans towards the defaulted bank j recover the part of j's assets left after the other creditors have been compensated. The recovery rate on an interbank loan, can be expressed as:
where A CB are central bank's loans to j and D are j's deposits. It is worth noticing that loss given default is LGD ≡ 1−ϕ, so that the net worth of creditor
Measuring systemic risk
Before dening systemic risk adjusted capital requirements (SCR) we clarify how we measure SR. We do it along two dimensions, that is vulnerability and impact. Vulnerability should be understood as the sensitivity of banks to a system-wide shock in terms of reduction in their equity. Conversely, impact measures the equity losses of the nancial system originated from the distress of a chosen bank. Two distinct techniques are adopted to quantify vulnerability and impact, that is network and market-based approaches.
Network approach: DebtRank
DebtRank is a systemic-risk measure and an algorithm introduced by Battiston et al. (2012) . It is conceived as a network measure inspired by feedback centrality with nancial institutions representing nodes. Distress propagates recursively from one (or more) node to the other, potentially giving rise to more than one round of contagion. Despite DebtRank is a measure of impact in strict sense, the algorithm can provide both measures of vulnerability and impact (see Section 6.2 for details), that we denote respectively by DR vul and DR imp .
When accounting for vulnerability, we impose a common shock on the balance sheets of all banks and let that the algorithm computes how the equities were aected after the shock had died out. Individual vulnerabilities produced by the stress test are expressed in terms of the relative equity loss of each bank (h) at the last step of the algorithm (τ = T ) after we impose a shock on assets.
If impact is considered, we impose the default of one bank at a time and observe the eects on equities of all the other. The impact of each bank on the rest of the system is the overall loss in capital produced by the default of bank i. The value for each institution (g) are obtained by imposing its default at the beginning of the algorithm. 
where M ES Sys i,t+h|t = E t r i,t+h|t |r < Ω is the tail expectation of the rm equity returns conditional on a systemic event, that happens when i's equity returns r from t − h to t are less than a threshold value Ω. Further details can be found in Section 6.3. Banks compute their LRM ES based on the last 200 5 The number of repetitions is lower in DR-imp to contain its computational time: by imposing the default bank-by-bank we end up with 500xN B runs of DebtRank for each period in the simulation. CoVaR is implicitly dened as the VaR of the nancial system (sys) conditional on an event C(r i,t ) of institution i:
where r represents ROE and the conditioning event C(r i ) corresponds to a loss of i equal or above to its V ar i α level.
∆CoV aR is a statistical measure of tail-dependency between market returns and individual returns, which is able to capture co-movements of variables in the tails and account for both spillovers and common exposures. ∆CoV aR is the part of systemic risk that can be attributed to i: it measures the change in value at risk of the nancial system at α level when the institution i shifts from its normal state (measured with losses equal to its median Var) to a distressed state (losses greater or equal to its Var). A aw of ∆CoV aR is its (at best) contemporaneity with systemic risk: it fails to capture the build-up of risk over time and suers of procyclicality. Furthermore, contemporaneous measures lead to the volatility paradox (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014) , inducing banks to increase the leverage target when contemporaneous measured volatility is low. A workaround would be to substitute contemporaneous with a forward-looking version of ∆CoV aR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016, p.1725 ). The latter is obtained by projecting on the regressors of ∆CoV aR their estimated coecients, where the independent variables include individual banks' characteristics and macro-state variables. Nevertheless our model lacks of the wide range of variables that can be employed in empirical works, as a results our measure of forward ∆CoV aR turns out to be strongly proportional to the V aR of banks, thus failing to capture the build up of systemic risk. 6 We account the nal value of the new worth before a bank is recapitalized, otherwise returns would be upwards biased by shareholders' capital.
3.4.
Adjusted Capital Requirements
In the benchmark case, i.e. without employing any SR measures, banks comply with a standard regulatory capital requirements. The net worth must be greater or equal than a fraction 1 λ = 4.5% of their risk-weighted-assets (RWA). 7
Dierently, Systemic-risk adjusted Capital Requirements (SCR) are derived from measures of SR. These metrics are then mapped into a coecient that can be interpreted as weighting the total assets by systemic-risk.
8 In other words, banks must hold a minimum net worth equal to a fraction of their assets given by the risk-weight coecient ψ.
and sr is a generic SR index. 9
If a sr = 0, then ψ = 1 λ and a bank must have a capital greater or equal than a standard regulatory threshold. When sr = 1, then ψ = 1 and capital requirements are as strict as possible, so that equity should equal assets, nw B = A.
Banks manage their balance sheet to meet capital requirements by setting their lending to rms and banks (which is limited upwards by (8) or (9)) and passively raising new capital by cumulation of prots.
Equation (9) can be obtained starting from the approach of Acharya et al.
(2012) and setting the expected capital shortfall (C S) equal to zero. 10 CS is the capital needed to restore capital adequacy ratio to the value set by the regulator:
it is the dierence between minimum regulatory capital expressed as a fraction 1 λ of assets and the value of equity in case of a crisis. Following Acharya et al. (2012) , to obtain (10) we assume that debt and liquidity are unchanged in case 7 We assign a weight ω 1 = 100% to loans to rms and ω 2 = 30% to interbank lending. Liquidity is assumed to be riskless, hence its weight is ω 3 = 0. Risk weighted assets of bank i can be expressed as RW
. 8 We do not dene an objective in terms of macroprudential policy, but each bank is subject to capital requirements as a function of its measured systemic-risk. 9 SR metrics (sr) are normalized in the interval [0, 1]. 10 We consider the nominal value of equity rather than its market value to accommodate for the characteristics of the macroeconomic model. If the market values is considered, CS corresponds to SRISK.
In other words, (9) determines the minimum level of capital that a bank should hold in order that its expected capital shortfall conditional to a systemic event equals zero.
Vulnerability adjusted capital requirements
Adjusted capital requirement based on vulnerability are obtained under the assumption that the conditional value of net worth is determined by a vulnerability measure:
where j = {LRM ES, DR vul }. Capital requirements for bank i are then obtained in (12) by imposing CS = 0, so that it should always maintain a capital buer great enough to avoid recapitalization during periods of distress.
Impact-adjusted capital requirements
We adopt a top-down approach to ensure consistency with the previous rule. Each bank should contribute to expected capital shortage in proportion to its systemic importance. We follow the approach in Gauthier et al. (2012) , but rather than determining the equity capital that should be reallocated to bank i from the total capitalization of the system, the left-hand side of (13) states the extra amount of CET1 capital as a fraction of the aggregate CS. This means that the additional capital required for each bank is:
Hence the target level of capital for bank i is given by the minimum regulatory level of capital plus the additional capital,
We can write adjusted capital requirement in the same form of (12).
Results
This section presents the results of simulations and policy experiments. We compare the benchmark scenario, where all banks are subject to the same xed regulatory ratio of RWA, to those where SCR are derived from measures of vulnerability or impact of nancial institutions, as described in Section 3.4. We we supply to the lack of uctuations of credit by simulating a lending boom, that is increasing the credit demand of rms in the periods before an external shock. It increases the exposures of banks and contributes to the build-up of the risk. Note that despite the elimination business cycles, the baseline dynamics produces a series of defaults and bankruptcies of rms and banks. These have a very lower extent before the shock than after. The presence of such nancial distress helps systemic risk measures to better capture the characteristics of banks. We turn on systemic-capital requirements at the beginning of the lending boom, so that macroprudential regulation becomes binding. We nally impose a scal-shock of 10 periods that consists in a progressive reduction of transfers to the household sector. The purpose of the shock is to reduce the disposable income of households, that in turn aects consumption and rms' prots. Firms with negative equity then cannot repay their debts to the banking sector, thus the initial shock triggers a series of losses through the interlocked balance sheets of agents. At the time of the shock transfers are reduced by 20% and then by an additional 1% per period with respect to the period before the shock. Fig. 2 summarizes what happens during each simulation.
The behaviour of SR measures over time is shown in 4.1. Autocorrelation is analysed in 4.2, and the eects of SCR are presented in Section 4.3.
SR measures over time
In the next lines we conduct a qualitative analysis of the behaviour of SR metrics over the shock. For this purpose SCR are not active, rather the results show the evolution of risk measures to understand their dierences. that is the increase in credit demand prior to the shock and reduced equity after it. Their trend is approximated by the exposure to equity ratio of the economy.
Some observation can be inferred with the help of Fig. 3 Therefore, the rst should be preferred because it would be more desirable to conduct macroprudential policy smoothly than suddenly imposing restrictions on banks' capital requirements, even more so if the change cannot be easily anticipated. Third, a stylized behavior of SR indexes can be characterized despite the time series are computed for the average. Vulnerability and impact of network-based measures are higher before the shock and lower after compared to market-based. This is clear looking at t ∈ [450, 460] in Fig. 3 , or at the individual breakdown represented in Fig. 4 . The latter is also useful to point out the limits of our approach: capital requirements are determined separately for vulnerabily and impact. Instead, they could be considered jointly, because otherwise low-vulnerability but high-impact banks would be penalized by capital requirements built on impact and viceversa. Therefore, a desirable property of SR measures is stability over time, that is the ranking of systemically important nancial institutions has no high variability and identies the same set of subjects in a given time span absent substantial changes in the nancial environment. We study the auto-correlation of SR metrics to understand how stable they are.
We consider a measure of rank correlation, Kendall's tau (τ k ), which is a non-parametric measure of correlation between pairs of ranked variables with values between −1 and 1. If two variables are perfectly correlated τ k = 1, otherwise if there is no correlation at all τ k = 0.
τ k = C − D n(n − 1)/2 where C and D are the total number of concordant and discordant pairs and n is the sample size. Moreover when two variables are statistical independent, a z statistics built on τ k tends to distribute as a standard normal, therefore it can be tested the null of no correlation versus the alternative of non-zero correlation. We compute τ k between the rank of SR measures of each bank and 
Policy Experiments
We present here the results of the policy experiments obtained under the four scenarios with active SCR and the benchmark case. Results for each policy are elaborated out of 100 Monte-Carlo runs. We cleaned the data to remove the outliers by trimming the observations above (below) the third (rst) quartile plus (minus) 3 times the interquartile range.
We start by focusing on the macroeconomic performance under SRC in Fig.s 5 and 6 . Within the vulnerability-based rules, market and network measures have approximately the same behavior for credit and output. They produce dynamics similar to the benchmark prior to the shock and yield a deterioration after. Most certainly the prociclicality of SR measures leads to a restriction in the credit supplied to the real economy after t = 450 and consequently to the lowered output. Looking at impact-based measures, they do worse than the benchmark even before the shock. In this case DR-imp produces a slighty better performance than ∆CoV aR on average, but in both cases with remarkable volatility. We have hyphotesized several reasons at the roots of the pattern for impact-based rules. The rst is that the map from SR measures to SCR might non achieve an optimal distribution of capital: for instance, demanding to hold extra capital in proportion to impact only does not account for the actual default probabilities, so that nancially sound banks might be required to further increase their capital. This results in hindering the lending activity. Another reason is that the model dynamics might be defective of the emergence of high-impact systemic-important banks: impact-based capital requirements would work better if applied to few highly systemic banks than to many banks which are systemic to a lower degree. SCR would allow to isolate the rst group without impairing too much lending. The second group of banks, which seems prevailing in our simulations, can be dened systemic as a herd" (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016) because its members show moderate values of impact but present similar behaviors and exposures to risk. Thus, SCR can be conter-productive because they limit lending capacity of a part of the nancial system. Following this line of thinking, SCR based on impact lead to an increase in the variance of the distribution of equity (Fig. 9 ), as they aect the protability of some banks but allow others for high exposures. As a result, under impact-SCR the capitalization of the nancial system as a whole is worse-o (Fig. 8) . In light of this, the probability of contagion is greater under rules based on impact, as in Fig. 7 . The greater nancial fragility of the banking sector makes it more likely that at least 10% of all banks (or rms) are simultaneously in bankruptcy. Conversely, vulnerability based policies decrease the likelihood of contagion.
Bench We conclude that SCR built on vulnerability minimize the probability of a contagion and achieve a macroeconomic performance comparable to the benchmark case before the shock. Due to their prociclicality, all SCR bring about credit rationing and reduced output after the crisis. This calls for a relaxation of macroprudential rules after the shock. Despite capital requirements based on impact should reduce the damages caused by systemic banks, we do not observe an improvement with respect to the benchmark case. This could descend from the construction of impact-based SCR, or because the model dynamics rarely let arise too big-to-fail" or too interconnected-to-fail" banks, but rather nancial institutions are systemic as a herd". Hence, imposing restrictions based on impact aects the lending ability of a number of banks and in turn their net-worth, reducing nancial soundness and paving the way to instability.
5.
Concluding remarks
We presented a methodology to compare a set of lender-targeted macro-prudential rules in which banks are subject to capital requirements built on systemic risk measures. Four metrics are considered: the rst set is composed by two marketbased measures (LRMES and ∆CoVaR), while the second one includes networkbased measures (DR-vul and DR-imp). Each set contains a metric for vulnerability, which states how much a nancial institution is systemically vulnerable to an adverse shock, and one measure for impact, which accounts for the eects of distress of single banks on the nancial system. Capital requirements are derived in Section 3 so that required capital is proportional to each bank's expected (or induced) capital shortage, which in turn depend on the SR measures.
The construction and the calibration of SCR aims to ease the comparison within each set of market and network based measures.
In Section 4 we employ an agent-based macroeconomic model to analyse and compare qualitatively and quantitatively macroprudential rules. We nd that all systemic-risk measures are prociclical to some degree. While market-based metrics display a regime switch after the exogenous shock, the network-based ones smoothly adjust with the exposures to equity ratio of the banking sector.
This suggests that they lack of predictive power and thus cannot be used to build Another key results is that SCR based on vulnerability are able to reduce contagion and to achieve a macroeconomic performance similar to the benchmark case before the aggregate shock. After it they should be relaxed to accommodate credit demand from rms. Despite procyclicality, the map from vulnerability to capital requirement provides an improvement with respect to the benchmark case. This can be interpreted as evidence that the individual measured values reect the actual vulnerability of banks in case of a systemic event.
Dierently, SCR based on impact cannot beat the benchmark. This result is specic to our model and have several interpretations: while SCR based on vulnerability are derived assuming that banks must be recapitalized depending on its expected losses conditional to a systemic-event, this is not true using a measure of impact. In this case capital requirements depends on the individual contribution to the expected aggregate shorfall, which is not directly connected to the equity of banks. Even though it is widely accepted that systemic banks can be identied and regulated conditional to the impact on the nancial system, this logic does not work well in our framework. One explanation is that raising additional capital to comply with regulation is easier for banks with high equity than for small ones, being equal their impact. This puts small banks at a disadvantage by impairing their lending ability and creates a less equal equity distribution, and a lower aggregate capitalization of the banking system than in the other scenarios. Moreover, results suggest that macroprudential policy should treat dierently too-big" or too-interconnected to-fail" and systemic as a herd" institutions. In the rst case the impact of one bank have critical eects on the nancial system, hence it is rational to impose capital surcharges.
In the latter case -as emerges in our model- In general, our approach is similar to that adopted in Battiston et al. (2016) , but we have adapted the algorithm to account for the structure of the underlying macro-model, as described in greater detail in Sect. 6.2. Given that the macro-environment includes rms, we rst impose the shock on rms' assets to compute the systemic vulnerability index DR vul . Next the induced distress transmits linearly to the assets of creditors (i.e. banks). This allows to capture the specic dynamics of the distress process. Our calibration strategy aims to compare market and network-based measures on a common ground. To do so, we apply to DebtRank the denition of systemic crisis employed in the SRISK framework. SRISK is computed by LRMES, which represents the expected equity loss of a bank in case of a systemic event. This is represented by a decline of market returns of 40% over the next six months. We run 100 Monte-Carlo simulations of the macro-model, record the market ROE and the rms' losses to equity ratio. Then we compute the change in market ROE over the past 180 periods (approximately six months). Finally we construct a vector of the losses of rms to their equities in those periods where the ROE declined at least by −40%.
To compute vulnerabilities by DebtRank we randomly sample from the vector of the empirical distribution of losses/equity at each repetition of the algorithm. Finally we obtain DR vul for each bank as an average of the realized values, after removing the 1st and the 99th percentiles. 
DebtRank
We employ a dierential version of the DebtRank algorithm in order to provide a network measure of systemic risk. Dierential DebtRank (Bardoscia et al., 2015) is a generalization of the original DebtRank (Battiston et al., 2012) which improves the latter by allowing agents to transmit distress more than once. Moreover our formulation has similarities with Battiston et al. (2016) , where it is assumed a sequential process of distress propagation. In our case we rst impose an external shock on rms' assets, then we sequentially account for the propagation to the banking sector through insolvencies on loans, to the interbank network and to rms' deposits.
The relative equity loss for banks (h) and rms (f ) is dened as the change in their net worth (respectively nw B , and nw F ) from τ = 0 to τ with respect to their initial net worth. In particular the initial relative equity loss of rms happens at τ = 1 due to an external shock on deposits:
The dynamics of the relative equity loss in rms and banks sectors is described by the sequence:
• Shock on deposits in the rms sector:
• Banks' losses on rms' loans:
• Banks' losses on interbank loans:
• Firms' losses on deposits:
Where p j is the default probability of debtor j and ϕ i , i = {loan, ib, dep} is the recovery rate on loans, interbank loans and deposits. Recovery rates on each kind of assets are randomly extracted from a vector of observations generated by the benchmark model.
For the sake of simplicity we can dene it as linear in f j (h k for banks), so that p j (τ ) = h(τ ) 11 . Λ is the exposure matrix that represents credit/debt relationships in the rms-banks 11 In a more realistic setting the default probability could be written as
where if α = 0 it corresponds to the linear DebtRank, while if α → ∞ it is the Furne algorithm (Bardoscia et al., 2016) . Moreover we can assume that deposits are not markedto-market, but they respond to the Furne algorithm, in other words the distress propagates network. It is written as a block matrix, where Λ bb refers to the interbank market, Λ bf refers to deposits, Λ f b refers to rm loans and Λ f f is a matrix of zeros.
The exposure matrix Λ represents potential losses over equity related to each asset at the beginning of the cycle, where each element has the value of assets at the numerator and the denominator is the net worth of the related creditor. in our specication rms have no intra-sector links, hence Λ f f = 0. In case there are N b = 2 banks and N f = 3 rms, the matrix Λ looks like: (Brownlees and Engle, 2012 ) is a widespread measure of systemic risk based on the idea that the latter arises when the nancial system as a whole is under-capitalized, leading to externalities for the real sector. To apply the measure to our model we follow the approach of Brownlees and Engle (2012) . The SRISK of a nancial rm i is dened as the quantity of capital needed to re-capitalize a bank conditional to a systemic crisis
where M ES Sys i,t+h|t = E r i,t+h|t |r < Ω is the tail expectation of the rm equity returns conditional on a systemic event, that happens when i's equity returns r from t − h to t are less than a threshold value Ω. Acharya et al. (2012) propose to approximate M ES Sys with its Long Run Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES), dened as a LRM ES i,t = 1 − exp{−18M ES 2% i,t } LRMES represents the expected loss on equity value in case the market return drops by 40% over the next six months. Such approximation is obtained through extreme value theory, by means of the value of MES that would be if the daily market return drops by −2%.
The bivariate process driving rms' (r i ) and market (rm) returns is only in case of default of the debtor. For deposits it might be reasonable to assume p D j (τ − 1) = 1 if h k (τ − 1) = 1 0 otherwise rm,t = σm,t m,t r i,t = σ i,t ρ i,t m,t + σ i,t 1 − ρ 2 i,t ξi, t (ξ i,t , m,t) ∼ F where σm,t is the conditional standard deviation of market returns, σ i,t is the conditional standard deviation of rms' returns, ρ i,t is the conditional market/rm correlation and and ξ are i.i.d. shocks with unit variance and zero covariance and ξ are i.i.d. shocks with unit variance and zero covariance.
M ES 2% is expressed setting Ω = −2%:
Conditional variances σ 2 m,t , σ 2 i,t are modelled with a TGARCH model from the GARCH family (Rabemananjara and Zakoian, 1993) . Such specication captures the tendency of volatility to increase more when there are bad news: σ 2 m,t = ωm + αmr 2 m,t−1 + γmr 2 m,t−1 I − m,t−1 + βmσ 2
I − m,t = 1 if rm,t < 0 and I − i,t = 1 when r i,t < 0, 0 otherwise.
Conditional correlation ρ is estimated by means of a symmetric DCC model (Engle, 2002) .
Moreover to obtain the M ES it is necessary to estimate tail expectations. This is performed with a non-parametric kernel estimation method (see Brownlees and Engle, 2012) . Open-source Matlab code is available thanks to Sylvain Benoit, and Gilbert Colletaz, Christophe Hurlin, who developed it in Benoit et al. (2013) . 6.4. ∆CoVaR Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) ∆CoV aR is estimated through a quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett Jr, 1978) on the α th quantile, where rsys and r i are respectively market-wide returns on equity and bank i's returns. Quantile regression estimates the α th percentile of the distribution of the dependent variable given the regressors, rather than the mean of the distribution of the dependent variable as in standard OLS regressions. This allows to compare how dierent quantiles of the regressand are aected by the regressors, hence it is suitable to analyse tail events. While Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) employ an estimator based on an augmented regression, we further simplify the estimation of ∆CoV aR following the approach in Benoit et al. (2013) , which is consistent with the original formulation.
First we regress individual returns on market returns:
The estimated coecients (denoted by ) are employed to build CoVaR. The conditional VaR of bank i (V ar i α,t ) is obtained from the quasi maximum likelihood estimates of conditional variance generated by the same TGARCH model described above (see Benoit et al., 2013, p.38) . Finally ∆CoV ar is obtained from the dierence between the α th and the median quantile of CoV ar. 
